[This piece has been authored by Anushruti Shah, a fourth-year law student at the Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur]
Introduction
A student-run group at NALSAR University of Law
[This piece has been authored by Anushruti Shah, a fourth-year law student at the Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur]
Introduction
[This post has been authored by Ms. Vasundhara, Managing Partner, Verum Legal and Mr. Mudit Kaushik, Counsel, Zeus IP. Part One can be found here]
International Precedents and Comparison
While every nation in the world strives to ensure the digital security of its citizens, there are very few legislative developments to back up the claim. The General Data Protection Regulations of the European Parliament that became effective from May 2018, is a unique legal framework that enforces a unilateral form of data security laws that all EU members comply with, to ensure the protection of the European market as a whole.
[This post has been authored by Ms. Vasundhara, Managing Partner, Verum Legal and Mr. Mudit Kaushik, Counsel, Zeus IP. Part Two can be found here]
Data breaches have become an issue for companies in the digital era, with no entity being spared for direct or even indirect involvement in a breach. Recently, Dominos Indiawas subject to a data breach by an unidentified hacker who allegedly took over 20 crore order details from Domino’s India server. What must have been worrisome for Dominos India would have been the fact that they collect information such as their customer’s name, email address, contact details, location and their address.
[This two-part essay has been authored by Aarya Pachisia, a 4th-year law student at Jindal Global Law School. Part One can be found here.]
Continuing the argument of how the executive seeks to control different actors under the Bill, this article focuses on executive control over the citizens. I advance the argument in two parts. First, I argue that under section 35 of the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 (‘the Bill’), a notification by the executive can exempt any stage agency from obtaining consent to process data of the citizens. There is no oversight mechanism envisaged by the Legislature under the Bill, as recommended by the Committee to validate or invalidate such notifications. Second, I argue that the Bill also considerably dilutes the consent framework under the Bill and drifts away from the concept of allowing the data subject to exercise control over personal data at every stage.
[This two-part essay has been authored by Aarya Pachisia, a 4th-year law student at Jindal Global Law School. Part Two can be found here.]
Technology is advancing at lightning speed, making privacy violations inevitable. Today, machine learning software is sophisticated enough to predict one’s sexual orientation, political and religious affiliation merely by processing their likes on Facebook. The Whatsapp Snooping scandal is another instance, where WhatsApp has filed a case in the court of California against the NSO group for hacking targets’ phones through the app. The case brought to light that unchecked power and absence of proper legal mechanism can lead to gross violations of right to privacy.
[This post has been authored by Shamik Datta and Shikhar Sharma, first year students at NALSAR University of Law and National Law School India University respectively.]
End-to-end encryption ensures that intermediaries or third parties don’t have access to the content of the message and identity of the communicating parties. However, Rule 4 (2) of the new Informational Technology (Guidelines for Intermediaries and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 specifies that all ‘significant social media intermediaries’ must enable the traceability of the first originator of a message. The collected information may be used if and when required by a court of competent jurisdiction or competent authority under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The information derived via the breaking of end-to-end encryption may be used to investigate offences abetted or caused by the spread of fake news. This includes open-ended offences like disturbing ‘public order’, which are broad in their scope, and thus, leave a wide scope for their blatant misuse and arbitrary interpretation. The proviso to Rule 4(2) states that intermediaries are not required to reveal the content of the message, or any other related information. However, under Rule 4 of the IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption) Rules, 2009, the government possesses the power to demand the revelation of the content of electronic messages. The government could, upon identifying the user under the 2021 Rules, ask the intermediary to decrypt the content of other messages of the same user under the 2009 IT Rules citing “public order” (for example, citing the history of the user as a fake news spreader). This would render the proviso to Rule 4(2) of the 2021 Rules meaningless. Therefore, when the information about the first originator is gathered via enabling traceability and powers to disclose the content of the message is exercised, it leads to a break in end-to-end encryption. This destroys the very purpose of the cryptographic keys and encryption protocols developed over the years to encode the messages and safeguard the identity of their sender.
[This post has been authored by Varsha Rajesh, a final year law student at School of Law, Christ University, Bangalore.]
In February 2021, the Department of Science and Technology of the Government of India issued the Guidelines for acquiring and producing geospatial data and geospatial data services including Maps which applies to entities collecting geospatial data, mapping and other allied products and services which are offered by the Government and privately-owned bodies.
[This post has been authored by Noyanika Batta, a Senior Associate at Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan Attorneys. She is a 2018 graduate from Gujarat National Law University.]
There exist dichotomous views on the usefulness of surveillance and its relationship with public health. The disease control strategies adopted by the states often necessitate extensive surveillance practices having an overbearing and intrusive effect on the daily lives of its citizens. The debate thus lies in striking the right balance between public health and the need to strengthen public health infrastructures vis-a-vis privacy protection for individual citizens. With the rapid spread of COVID19 debilitating economies and causing health systems across the globe to crumble, it became imperative for governments and organizations to take immediate actions to protect its people. This in turn saw a fierce boom in surveillance technologies dedicated towards monitoring whole populations, with governments trying to chart the virus’ trajectory from broad swathes of personal data. This article seeks to examine the disproportionate risks to data privacy caused by the use of invasive and pervasive technologies such as contact tracing across the world.
[This two-part post has been authored by Riddhi Bang and Prerna Sengupta, second year students at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. Part II can be found here]
With the wave of machine learning and technological development, a new system that has arrived is the Facial Recognition Technology (FRT). From invention to accessibility, this technology has grown in the past few years. Facial recognition comes under the aegis of biometric data which includes distinctive physical characteristics or personal traits of a person that can be used to verify the individual. FRT primarily works through pattern recognition technology which detects and extracts patterns from data and matches it with patterns stored in a database by creating a biometric ‘template’. This technology is being increasingly deployed, especially by law enforcement agencies and thus raises major privacy concerns. This technology also attracts controversy due to potential data leaks and various inaccuracies. In fact, in 2020, a UK Court of Appeal ruled that facial recognition technology employed by law enforcement agencies, such as the police, was a violation of human rights because there was “too broad a discretion” given to police officers in implementing the technology. It is argued that despite the multifarious purposes that this technology purports to serve, its use must be regulated.