This is the second part of a two-part post by Benjamin Vanlalvena, a final year law student at NALSAR University of Law. In this post, he critiques a recent judgement by the Supreme Court which allowed Magistrates to direct an accused to give voice samples during investigation, without his consent. Part 1 can be found here.
Judicial discipline and the doctrine of imminent necessity
In the previous part, I dealt with the certain privacy concerns that may arise with respect to voice sampling and how various jurisdictions have approached the same. In this part, I will be critiquing the manner in which the Supreme Court in Ritesh Sinha has imparted legislative power onto itself, is by the terming the absence of legislative authorization for voice sampling of accused persons as a procedural anomaly, and extending its power in filling such assumed voids by invoking not only the principle of ejusdem generis, but also citing the “principle of imminent necessity”.