A student-run group at NALSAR University of Law
[This is the second part of a two-part article analysing ChatGPT and its legal implications. It is authored by K Nand Mohan in the second year, and RS Sanjanaa in the third year at Symbiosis Law School, Pune. The first part can be found here]
Inherent Drawbacks of ChatGPT and their Legal Implications
[This Explainer has been authored by Harsh Jain and Sankalp Jain of the NALSAR Tech Law Forum Blog.]
The over-the-top (‘OTT’) industry in India has been growing exponentially–faster than anywhere else in the world–and pegged to reach a size of $5 billion by the year 2023. With an increase in internet penetration, coverage and speed, the consumption of content available on OTT streaming services is at an all-time high. This has not only increased the accessibility to titles old and new, but has also created a new avenue for content-creation on diverse themes. As the pandemic led to the closure of movie theatres and other forms of public entertainment, OTT platforms have been growing in India along with the rest of the world.
[This post has been authored by our reporters – Harsh Jain and Harshita Lilani. They discuss the controversies surrounding Copyright law in India and highlight the recommendations sent by the Technology Law Forum to the Registrar of Copyrights.]
The last amendment to the Indian Copyright Act was made in the year 2012 and therefore, the news that a reform process had begun was a welcome development. However, the fact that the process began with ‘private consultations’ has raised many concerns. The impact of any Copyright Law reform would be far-reaching and, therefore, must involve all stakeholders – authors, industry players, academicians, students, and more. This also means that the reforms must be forward-looking – to be able to anticipate and adapt to changing times.
Welcome to our fortnightly newsletter, where our reporters Kruttika Lokesh and Dhananjay Dhonchak put together handpicked stories from the world of tech law! You can find other issues here.
The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology announced in a press release on 29th June that it had invoked its powers under section 69A of the Information Technology Act to ban 59 Chinese applications. The Indian government cited ‘raging concerns on aspects relating to data security and safeguarding the privacy of 130 crore Indians’ as reasons behind the ban. The move comes after a border skirmish with China resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers. Regardless of the cybersecurity concerns cited in the press release, speculation remains rife over whether the ban was a retaliatory measure in light of the worsening geopolitical situation between India and China. India is a huge market for Chinese apps, particularly for the video-sharing platform Tik-Tok which had previously been banned in February 2019 for encouraging the spread of pornography and ‘cultural degradation’. The ban was ultimately lifted after assurances by Tik-Tok that it had the tools to censor explicit content. The current ban has been called a purely political decision and criticised for its procedural impropriety and its excessive restriction on dissemination of online content.
Welcome to our fortnightly newsletter, where our reporters Kruttika Lokesh and Dhananjay Dhonchak put together handpicked stories from the world of tech law! You can find other issues here. [Ed Note: This newsletter has been prepared by Dhananjay Dhonchak and Sanchit Khandelwal]
Paytm has knocked the doors of the Delhi High Court complaining that the telecom operators are not taking action against fraudsters carrying out phishing activities under Paytm’s name. The petitioner has claimed that its users are being duped using unsolicited commercial communications (UCC) in the form of SMS or voice calls made over telecom companies’ networks.
[This is the first part of a two-part article by Ankush Rai, a 3rd year student at NALSAR University of Law.]
In a recent case, the Delhi High Court accepted that summons could be served by WhatsApp and also stated that a ‘double tick’ would prima facie imply that summons have been duly delivered. This case serves as an example of how courts in India have gradually allowed for summons to be served through various electronic means. Additionally, this case also brings forth two larger points for consideration. Firstly, law and society are constantly in flux and one should adapt to the changes in the other. In this case, the law has adapted to the technological changes in society with the help of courts. Secondly, technology can be used to fulfil the larger objectives of law and justice in an effective and efficient manner. Herein, sticking to the ancient and rigid means of delivering summons would have further delayed the disposal of the case. By accepting WhatsApp messages as summons the Court fulfilled the larger objective of an efficient and speedy trial.
The Delhi High Court ordered Facebook, Google and Instagram to remove search result, posts and any content containing allegations of sexual harassment against artist Subodh Gupta. These include blocking/removal of social media posts, articles and Google Search result links. The allegations were made about a year ago, by an unknown co-worker of Gupta on an anonymous Instagram account ‘Herdsceneand’. These allegations were also posted on Facebook and circulated by news reporting agencies. An aggrieved Subodh Gupta then filed a civil defamation suit, stating these allegations to be false and malicious. Noting the seriousness of the allegations, the Court passed an ex-parte order asking the Instagram account holder, Instagram, Facebook and Google to take down this content. The Court has now directed Facebook to produce the identity of the person behind the account ‘Herdsceneand’ in a sealed cover.
Further Reading:
A student from National Law School of India, Bengaluru filed a petition in the Kerala high court seeking a ban on the mobile application – Telegram. The reason cited for this petition is that the app has no checks and balances in place. There is no government regulation, no office in place and the lack of encryption keys ensures that the person sending the message can not be traced back. It was only in June this year that telegram refused to hand over the chat details of the ISIS module to the National Investigation Agency. As compared to apps such as Watsapp, Telegram has a greater degree of secrecy. One of the features Telegram boasts of is the ‘secret chat’ version which notifies users if someone has taken a screenshot, disables the user from forwarding of messages etc. Further, there are fewer limits on the number of people who can join a channel and this makes moderation on the dissemination of information even more difficult. It is for this reason that telegram is dubbed as the ‘app of choice’ for many terrorists. It is also claimed that the app is used for transmitting vulgar and obscene content including child pornography. Several countries such as Russia and Indonesia have banned this app due to safety concerns.
Further Reading:
In a significant ruling, the European Court of Justice ruled that Facebook can be ordered to take down posts globally, and not just in the country that makes the request. It extends the reach of the EU’s internet-related laws beyond its own borders, and the decision cannot be appealed further. The ruling stemmed from a case involving defamatory comments posted on the platform about an Austrian politician, following which she demanded that Facebook erase the original comments worldwide and not just from the Austrian version worldwide. The decision raises the question of jurisdiction of EU laws, especially at a time when countries are outside the bloc are passing their own laws regulating the matter.
Further Reading:
The Digital Trade Agreement was signed by USA and Japan on October 7, 2019. The Agreement is an articulation of both the nations’ stance against data localization. The trade agreement cemented a cross-border data flow. Additionally, it allowed for open access to government data through Article 20. Articles 12 and 13 ensures no restrictions of electronic data across borders. Further, Article 7 ensures that there are no customs on digital products which are electronically transmitted. Neither country’s parties can be forced to share the source code while sharing the software during sale, distribution, etc. The first formal articulation of the free flow of digital information was seen in the Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), which was a key feature of the Osaka Declaration on Digital Economy. The agreement is in furtherance of the Trump administration’s to cement America’s standing as being tech-friendly, at a time when most other countries are introducing reforms to curb the practices of internet giants like Google and Facebook, and protect the rights of the consumers. American rules, such as Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shields companies from any lawsuits related to content moderation. America, presently appears to hope that their permissive and liberal laws will become the framework for international laws.
Further Reading:
The Ministry of Economic Affairs in its recent press release dated July 22, 2019, prepared a report on the Committee on Virtual Currencies, which proposed a ban on the so-called “private cryptocurrencies”.
The Government of India had constituted an Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) on November 2, 2017 under the Chairmanship of Shubash Chandra Garg (Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs) in order to study the issues related to virtual currencies and propose specific action to be taken in this matter. The committee recommended that all private cryptocurrency like Bitcoins should be banned due to the volatile nature of their price. Additionally, a fine of INR 25 Crore may be levied and imprisonment of up to 10 years may be awarded for carrying on activities associated with cryptocurrencies in India.
The report garnered a lot of negative attention, with the crypto community taking the view that it was extremely backward looking and had a regressive approach to such a futuristic concept. In order to recognize the impact of the announcement, it is necessary to first understand what virtual currency is.
A virtual currency is a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as (a) a medium of exchange, and/or (b) a unit of account, and/or (c) a store of value, but does not have legal tender status. A virtual currency is a private medium of exchange that does not in any way reflect a sovereign guarantee of the value or legal tender status. Virtual currency is therefore distinguished from the FIAT currency of a country that is designated as its legal tender. Cryptocurrencies are a subset of virtual currencies that is decentralized and protected by cryptography. Bitcoin is an example of a cryptographic virtual currency, and was the first of its kind.
Currently, the term “legal tender” finds expression under Section 26 of the RBI Act, which states that, “every bank note shall be legal tender at any place in India in payment or on account for the amount expressed therein, and shall be guaranteed by the Central Government”. The main point of difference between fiat currency and virtual currency is that while the former is expressly guaranteed by the Central Government, the latter does not provide for the same. In order for any virtual currency to be declared as legal tender, it would need to be expressly guaranteed by the Central Government. Only in that scenario would the parties be legally bound to accept it as a mode of payment.
In the third chapter of the report committed projected the idea of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) that shall be the “Digital Rupee” to be the sole cryptocurrency in India having the following key attributes-
Having discussed the above, the Committee appreciated the regulatory concerns associated with virtual currencies. The topics relating to Distributed Ledger Technology (‘DLT’) and Blockchain were delved into deeply and their complexity duly recognized. DLT refers to technologies that involve the use of independent computers to record, share and synchronize transactions in their respective electronic ledgers. Keeping such distributed ledgers obviates the need for keeping the data centralized as is done in a traditional ledger, which is why DLT is extensively utilized by virtual currencies.
Primarily, a transaction under DLT refers to the transfer of ‘value’ from one to another, which could be a record of ownership of assets— money, security, land titles, etc. — or the record of specific information such as information about one’s identity or health. Blockchain, on the other hand, refers to a specific kind of DLT which uses codes to encrypt transactions and stack them up in blocks, creating Blockchains.
As mentioned above, the IMC recognizes the potential of DLT and Blockchain and acknowledges that the application of DLT is being explored in the areas of trade finance, mortgage loan applications, digital identity management or KYC requirements, cross-border fund transfers and clearing and settlement systems. To that effect, the Committee advised the Department of Economic Affairs to take necessary measures to facilitate the use of DLT in the entire financial field after identifying its uses, and further suggested that regulators such as RBI, SEBI, IRDA, PFRDA, and IBBI explore the idea of evolving appropriate regulations for development of DLT in their respective areas.
Consequently, the IMC is of the view that it “would be advisable to have an open mind regarding the introduction of an official digital currency in India”. It is pertinent to note that that the RBI Act has the enabling provisions to permit the central government to approve a “Central Bank Digital Currency” (CBDC) as legal tender in India.
While the use of technology in virtual currencies has multiple upsides, it is not without grave risk. The IMC was of the view that private cryptocurrencies lack the necessary attributes of a currency, such as a fixed nominal value that characterizes legal currency.
Another concern plaguing the committee is that non-official virtual currencies can be used to defraud consumers, particularly unsophisticated consumers or investors. The IMC gives the example of the Rs. 2,000 crore scam involving GainBitcoin in India where investors were duped by a Ponzi scheme. In addition to the above, it has been observed that certain volatility exists when dealing with such currencies. In a country where lakhs of traders get involved in such currencies, this could have huge implications. Secondly, the IMC is worried that if private cryptocurrencies are allowed to function as legal tender, the RBI would lose control over monetary policy and financial stability, as it would not be able to keep a tab on the money supply in the economy.
Also, the anonymity of private digital currencies poses a risk to law enforcement, due to the potential for its use in illegal activities such as money laundering and terrorist financing activities. The lack of grievance redressal mechanisms is another major issue, due to the irreversible nature of such transactions.
The IMC report promulgates that the government should consider an official digital currency in lieu of private virtual currencies or crypto coins and tokens. On the other hand, the committee notes the risks involved and volatility in the prices of private cryptocurrencies, which inevitably led to them recommending a ban on cryptocurrencies in India and imposing fines and penalties for carrying on of any activities connected with cryptocurrencies.
This has been subjected to backlash from private traders who have sharply criticized Section 2.7 of the Recommendations which states that “the Committee notes with serious concern mushrooming of cryptocurrencies almost invariably issued abroad and numerous people in India investing in these cryptocurrencies. All these cryptocurrencies have been created by non-sovereigns and are in this sense entirely private enterprises.”
The IMC has opined that these crypto-assets are not backed by any intrinsic value, which have not been recognized as a legal tender in any jurisdiction, but that’s not entirely true. Many cryptocurrencies, these days, are backed by petroleum, gold, as well as the US dollar in the case of Facebook’s Libra. The IMC does not make any differentiation among cryptocurrencies that are not backed by any central banks. The report presents energy consumption as an issue in the context of Bitcoin mining, however, the report does not delve into the numerous solutions suggested world over to curb this consumption. Cryptocurrencies have never been used as a legal tender or currency in India, nor was it the expectation of any crypto startup. It has always been traded as an asset, which is now being banned.
In reference to the same, the panel has asked the government to consider the launch of an official government-backed digital currency in India, to function like banknotes, through the Reserve Bank of India. Authorities in various countries are considering how to regulate cryptocurrencies, particularly after Facebook announced plans to launch one called Libra, because of risks to the financial system and consumer data. According to recent reports, Libra will not be launched in India due to the current Indian regulation of not endorsing private cryptocurrencies. While Libra is likely to have a massive impact on global e-commerce, it is in the money transfer space where it could be a potential game-changer.
Aside from an extremely brief inspection of the application of DLT in India, the report also includes the proposed bill banning crypto assets that will be presented to the Supreme Court as well. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court accepts or rejects the same in toto or comes up with their own guidelines on the issue.
Introduction
Recently, in the Indian state of Gujarat, several Police Commissioners have issued orders restricting use of the popular game of Player Unknown’s Battleground (“PUBG”) under Section 144 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”). In pursuance of the same, 10 youngsters were reportedly arrested for disregarding these orders under Section 188 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC). Subsequently, a PIL was filed in the Gujarat High Court by the Internet Freedom Foundation challenging the ban orders & arrests made by Gujarat Police. However, it was dismissed on the ground that the scope of the said petition does not fall under the ambit of “public interest litigation”.
In contrast, another PIL was filed in Bombay High Court by an 11-year old through his father, praying for initiation of PUBG ban, on the grounds that it promotes immoral conduct such as violence, aggression, gaming addiction, cyber-bullying etc. Following this, a Bench of the court directed the Secretary of IT Ministry to review the game and take actions if any ‘objectionable content’ is found in it. The matter is presently pending before the court.
The questions that arise here whether the orders of the Gujarat Police to ban PUBG are arbitrary or not; and whether the arrests made by the police in this regard are illegal or not. The present post shall first address and answer the above questions. This shall be followed by the analysis on the interplay between the judicial and executive process of banning the game. Subsequently, the post will put forth recommendations based on the overall discussion.
Why the Orders on PUBG Are Arbitrary & Unreasonable?
It is S. 37(3) of Gujarat Police Act, 1951 (“GP Act”) and S. 144 of Cr.P.C. that provides power to the Police to issue orders in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger. The English translation of concerned orders states:
“…it comes to our knowledge that due to games like PUBG GAME/MOMO CHALLENGE violent traits are shown to be increased in youth and children. Due to these games, the education of children and youth are being affected and it affects the behaviour, manners, speech and development…”
A perusal of the order shows that the police had issued it without any substantive evidence to prove PUBG provoking violent traits. In fact, the order was issued based on mere knowledge and perception of threat without adequate evidentiary substantiation. This is in complete violation of the Ramlila Maidan Incident, In Re [(2012) 5 SCC 1] case, where the Supreme Court of India held that Section 144 cannot be invoked in case of mere apprehension, without any material facts to indicate that the apprehension is imminent or genuine.
Secondly, orders can be issued under Section 144 if there exists an urgent situation which could result in grave consequences as held in the case of Madhu Limaye v. SDM Monghyr [(1971) AIR SC 2486]. Certainly, playing PUBG does not constitute any urgent or grave consequences and is merely a game for the purpose of entertainment. Moreover, the allegation on PUBG having violent traits to cause grave consequences, was recently rejected by the Nepal Supreme Court on April’19, who stayed the PUBG ban imposed by Nepal’s government.
Lastly, the Police orders have imposed restriction on the right of free speech & expression under Article 19 of our Constitution by banning PUBG, and has thereby disregarded the ‘test of proportionality’, as applied by A.K.Sikri J. in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India [(2019) 1 SCC 1, p. 132]. As per this test, the state can impinge a right (i) if there exists a law for it; (ii) such that the restriction must have a legitimate state aim; (iii) and should not have any disproportionate impacts on the right’s holder. In relation to (i), it is true that the Cr.P.C. contemplates statutory provisions to restrict such rights. However, in the present case, the Police officials have not properly adhered to it while imposing the ban, as has been discussed above. As for (ii), a ‘legitimate’ aim for the state entails making a lawful approach to maintain players’ health and tranquillity. Apparently, the police’s order does not constitute a legitimate aim as it was based on the rationale of controlling moral panic (and not health), and is bad in law. The aim pf “moral panic” is subjective and discretionary as what is moral for one, may not be moral for other. Moreover, in relation to (iii), the arrests of students made by the virtue of the said orders will have disproportionate impacts on them as they were arrested for merely playing a game. These arrests will in harm the students’ reputation at school, college and office, having a deeply negative impact on them. A proportionate approach would be psychological counselling & social support and not criminal prosecution or imprisonment initiated by the ban. Hence, the orders of the Police Commissioners are arbitrary and unreasonable.
Why the Arrests Made by Police are Illegal?
Statutorily, an arrest can be made under Section 188 of IPC for violating Section 144 of Cr.P.C. A person could be arrested only if he disobeys the order duly promulgated by a public servant, and if such disobedience causes, tends to cause, or risks obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed. However, a mere disobedience of Section 144, without the aforesaid elements, is not a ground for arrest under Section 188 and the same was observed by the court in the case of Ramlila Maidan. Interestingly, Mumbai police used PUBG to promote helmet necessity for riders by sharing an image of a character of the game wearing helmet on their Twitter handle. Such promotion of game by public servants reflects that even the state’s own machinery does not apprehend any ‘obstruction, annoyance or injury’ being caused by playing PUBG. Certainly, the arrest made are illegal as it was done beyond the scope of the concerned provision.
Moreover, in the case of Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1981 SC 2198], the Supreme Court held that the purpose of Section 144 is to provide adequate, reasonable and temporary remedy to ‘emergency cases’ of nuisance or apprehended danger. Similarly, in Acharya Jagdishwarand Avadhuta v. Police Commissioner, Calcutta [AIR 1984 SC 512], the Supreme Court held that the nature of the order under Section 144, Cr.P.C. is intended to meet ‘emergent’ situation. In the present case, the Police orders gave reasons that the education of children are being affected through PUBG. This effect on their studies does not constitute any ‘emergent’ situation under which there exist any risk of apprehended danger.
Thus, the ban orders as well as the arrests made by the Gujarat Police are unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal and are exercised beyond the permissible limits of the statutory provisions. If at all, a PUBG ban is found to be required, there is a proper procedure that has been statutorily stipulated to initiate it, as has been explained below:
How to Initiate A Ban On PUBG?
The Information & Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”) has set out the complete process of blocking Apps or online games under the Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public Rules, 2009 (‘Rules’). Such blocking can be done either by the officers defined under the IT Act [I] or by any order issued by the court of law [II].
I. By the Executive
Rule 4 states that a “Nodal Officer” should be compulsorily be appointed by the organisation (mainly the state-government) to whom a citizen can submit his/her request for blocking any electronic information. After examining the request, the Nodal Officer transfers the application of request to the “Examination Committee” headed by the “Designated Officer”. As per the Rules, the Designated Officer is appointed by the Central government along with other representatives of Ministry of I&B, Law & Justice and Home Affairs, who are not below the rank of a Joint Secretary. This Committee checks whether the application is in accordance with Section 69A of IT Act or not and in turn submits a recommendation to the Secretary, Dept. of IT though the Designated Officer.
The direction of blocking the information is passed after the approval of the recommendation by the Secretary. This direction should also provide the reasons for blocking the game. A Review Committee, set up by the Central government, further validates this direction by setting up meetings after every 2 months and may set aside the blocking orders (if direction is not in conformity with Section 69A of the IT Act), as prescribed under Rule 14.
II. By the Court
The Rule 10 authorizes the court to block any electronic information and bounds the Designated Officer to implement the same as soon as he receives the copy of that order. Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act holds intermediaries liable for non-compliance of the court’s order. For example, the Court in 2017 took suo moto cognizance to ban the Blue Whale Game and directed the government & intermediaries like Google Play, Apple Store etc to remove the said game from their domains.
Further, as mentioned above, any such ban must be in conformity with Section 69A of the IT Act, which provides a list of grounds based on which any electronic information may be blocked. This list includes reasons such as security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence. The potentially suitable ground in the PUBG case, namely ‘preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence’ has itself been interpreted as cognizable offence by the Indian courts. Therefore, the court can initiate a ban on the PUBG only after it is proved by the authorities that such game contains content which can led to the commission of any cognizable offence. Similarly, the concerned authorities defined under the Rules, 2009 can impose a ban only if they find the working of the App in contradiction to the Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000. Although Bombay High Court has made an effort to adhere to rules set out under IT Act, 2000 by approaching the Secretary of IT Ministry, yet both Gujarat Police and Gujarat HC have miserably failed to acknowledge the banning procedures under IT Act, 2000. Moreover, the Gujarat Police have processed ban which do not met the requirements of Section 69A of IT Act, 2000.
Recommendations
In view of the above discussion and analysis, the author would like to propose following recommendations:
The “Existence” of a Non-Existent Law and the Broader Issues it Raises
The Information Technology Act 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “IT Act”), India’s nodal law on regulation of information technology, was significantly amended in 2008 in order to plug certain loopholes in the original Act as well as accommodate further technological development within its legal framework. Among other things, this 2008 amendment to the Act introduced Section 66A, which essentially made sharing of “grossly offensive”, “insulting” or “menacing” information (Read: criticism of political parties) through electronic media a criminal offence.
In its landmark 2015 judgment of Shreya Singhal v. The Union of India, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A on the ground that it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art 19(1)(a) of our Constitution, a fundamental right closely tied to the democratic ideal of constructive criticism of public authorities. In the Court’s own words, “(Section 66A) takes within its sweep protected speech and speech that is innocent in nature and is liable therefore to be used in such a way as to have a chilling effect on free speech and would, therefore, have to be struck down on the ground of overbreadth.” (paragraph 90, emphasis added). Needless to say, this judgment was widely celebrated as a victory for free speech in general and online free speech in particular.
Shockingly however, Section 66A is still in use. Most recently, Priyanka Sharma , BJP’s Youth Wing convenor from Howrah was booked under this Section for circulating a meme ridiculing Mamata Banerjee (Surprisingly, even her order for bail makes no mention of the fact that one of the Sections she was booked under is unconstitutional). In another instance, a man from Guntur was arrested under Section 66A for duping people on a dating app through impersonation. Further, in March last year, Lucknow citizen Rahat Khan was one among five people booked under this Section for allegedly making “offensive” comments against UP Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. (Interestingly-, he was later offered the position of social media in-charge for AIMIM). The same story holds true for a Gujarat Based lawyer- activist who made allegedly “offensive” religious statements against a particular group, and for a teenager in Tamil Nadu who targeted Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a private Facebook chat. Appallingly, a Telangana man was even convicted under Section 66A by a local court for making derogatory comments on social media. The list is sadly unending. Thus, to cut a long story short, Section 66A is being used rampantly even today.
A recent Hindustan Times Report in fact indicates that more than 3,000 people have been booked under Section 66A after its declaration as unconstitutional. Ironically, this is about 500 people more than those who were booked under this Section in 2014 when there was no judgment pronouncing upon its unconstitutionality. In substantiation, another independent study found several Section 66A cases being listed on portals like Indian Kanoon and SCC Online (neither of which are exhaustive) post 2015, some even having even culminated in convictions. Further, National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data for 2015-16 also shows continued arrests under Section 66A. Thus, it is abundantly clear that Section 66A is enjoying a healthy life even four years after its judicial death. Such an extension of its lifespan is nothing short of a mockery of the Supreme Court, our country’s highest judicial body.
Such a mockery of the Supreme Court can be traced back to either the intentional use the Section or alternatively to its inadvertent use by the police and the judiciary. However, it is important to note that these reasons are not mutually exclusive. As also argued by Abhinav Sekhri and Apar Gupta, it is the combination of knowing misuse and inadvertent use of Section 66A which is proving to be deadly for free speech in India.
In substantiation of the first limb of this combination, there is ample evidence to show that the Government has done little to stop continued use of Section 66A despite having notice of the same. For instance, when NCRB data (which has been referred to above) was used to point out the Government’s failure to contain this Section’s use post Shreya Singhal, the NCRB (a government agency) amusingly issued a “corrigendum” which essentially stated that this data was incorrect. Even more amusingly, it stopped publishing data on Section 66A from then on!
In another instance, it was observed that since Section 66A was declared unconstitutional, there was increased cases under Section 66 and 67 of the IT Act. As also argued by several Reports, this shows that in instances where the police realise that Section 66A is unconstitutional, they cover up their mistake by merely changing the section numbers. As a result, citizens are essentially arrested and fit into Sections which prima facie are not applicable to their case. This not only harasses them and wastes public machinery, but also causes a chilling effect – the very thing Shreya Singhal intended to avoid.
In a third example, the Government took no action against a stern notice issued to it by the Supreme Court in response to a 2019 PIL filed before it by the PUCL highlighting the continued use of Section 66A. Notably, the official Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology page containing the IT Act contains no mention of Section 66A’s unconstitutionality till date.
Additionally, day in and day out, there are numerous reports about use of Section 66A in the press, and it is no coincidence that most of these reports concern statements against political leaders and their parties, including the ruling party. Thus, it is a stretch to believe that our leaders do not know about this unconstitutional use (news regarding Section 66A literally concerns themselves). Despite such knowledge (Read: Because of this knowledge), none of our legislators or executive officials have brought this issue to either the Parliament or the Executive. The Parliament can easily issue an enabling amendment to the Act scrapping the Section; alternatively, the Executive can very easily issue a notification to that effect. Sadly, it comes as no surprise that nether of these two things have been done till date. Thus, it is clear that the Government is knowingly turning a blind eye towards the unconstitutional use of Section 66A.
However (in substantiation of the second limb of the combination), it is important to note that not all use of Section 66A post Shreya Singhal is politically motivated or intentionally malicious. Many instances show that the police are simply not aware that the Section has been pronounced unconstitutional. Alternatively, there is no clarity as to the exact effect of Shreya Singhal, considering that Section 66A is still present in the bare text of the Statute. In a documented instance, a Police Inspector expressed complete ignorance about the unconstitutionality of Section 66A and when the same was pointed out to him, he said that “it was one particular case only” and that he had aptly booked the concerned accused. Even an officer as senior as Inspector General of Police and Commissioner of Police, Jalandhar was quoted as saying that nothing can be done until the “Government has issued a notification.” Thus, Section 66A is also being used inadvertently.
The effect of such its knowing and unknowing use is that the onus of enforcing the verdict in Shreya Singhal is put on defendants, who are not reasonably expected to know the details of which statutory provisions are unconstitutional. Additionally, as mentioned above, such use is a direct affront to the judiciary and renders its judgment effectively meaningless. Needless to add, every unconstitutional use of Section 66A is curtailing the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression, which is the touchstone against which a democracy is judged. One can only imagine the chilling effect such a curtailment has had in present times against the backdrop of Lok Sabha elections in the country.
Thus, it is imperative to ensure that the Court’s verdict in Shreya Singhal is enforced at the earliest through any and all possible means such as amendment, notification and widespread promulgation to enforcement agencies and the general public.
On a broader note, the Section 66A story is a case in point – it points towards wider problems related to promulgation of judicial decisions and their enforcement. On this point, it is important to note that there is no written or institutionalized mechanism of making judgments of our courts (including the Supreme Court) known to even the police and the judiciary (let alone the general public). As is seen through the case of Section 66A illustrated above, lack of such a mechanism is questioning the very relevance of our judiciary on a daily basis. Against this backdrop, it is imperative that we deliberate to bring out better promulgation strategies in the near future. While this might not be practically possible for every case, we can atleast make a beginning by ensuring that there is a practice to promulgate bare text law-changing decisions of the Supreme Court to government institutions like the police and the judiciary. By doing so, we can at the very least attempt to ensure that a 66A-like situation does not arise again.